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Introduction: A New Era for Intellectual Property in China? 
 
When it comes to Intellectual Property (IP) protection, it is difficult to think of a country with a 
worse reputation than the People’s Republic of China (henceforth, “the PRC” or “China”). Ask 
most American lawyers about China’s IP law, and they’ll likely respond with a wry smile and a 
rhetorical question: “Does it exist?” More experienced practitioners might recall colorful stories 
of Sonya Sotomayor in her days as a litigator, zipping through the narrow alleyways of New 
York’s Chinatown on a motorcycle in hot pursuit of Fendi counterfeiters.i 
These impressions are not without basis in fact. According to the United States Customs 
and Border Protection Office of Trade, China is by far the highest source of imported 
counterfeits, with the PRC and Hong Kong together comprising 83% of total seizures in 2015. ii 
United States Government Accountability Office statistics show that Chinese actors are by far 
the most heavily represented respondents in IP-related investigations, dwarfing the next most 
cited respondent (Japan) nearly fourfold.iii The Office of the United States Trade Representative 
repeatedly highlights “serious problems with intellectual property rights enforcement” in its 
annual reports about China.iv 
Even US President Donald Trump cannot escape the ignominy of Chinese IP theft. A 
cursory search of China’s State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) trademark 
database reveals 53 filings for the “Trump” brand, many of which are obviously not from the 
man himself.v The “Trump”-branded products range from leather goods to light beverages.vi 
Naturally, President Trump has made China’s lackluster protection of IP a central target 
of his public ire. During his campaign, Donald Trump’s website specifically called for the US to 
go after China for stealing intellectual property.vii The administration already appears to be 
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making good on the president’s campaign promise. On February 9, 2017, President Trump 
issued an executive order singling out “IP Theft” as an enforcement priority, borrowing 
terminology from his notoriously anti-China trade advisor, Peter Navarro.viii, ix Five days later, 
Representative Steve King (R – IA) introduced a bill that would “require the imposition of duties 
on Chinese origin goods in an amount equal to the estimated losses from IPR violations suffered 
by US companies.”x The text of the bill, which has not yet passed, is tantamount to a 
declaration of trade war by the United States against China. Commentators are now predicting 
conflicts over IP as a “looming storm” for US-China bilateral relations.xi 
Trump’s bluster misses a larger point. While it is true that China is a capital of IP 
infringement, it is also true that the PRC has done a great deal in recent years to improve its 
ability to protect IP and invest in innovation. Given this, does China really deserve its miserable 
reputation, or is at the dawn of a new era for IP, one in which China will become a center of 
innovation and a defender of IP rights? 
 By examining a new judicial institution, the Beijing Intellectual Property Court (BJIPC), 
this paper unearths the seeds of IP reform that China has planted in its capital, explaining how 
the Court has made enormous strides that have the potential to transform China’s IP 
environment. The BJIPC’s innovative and experimental procedures have produced the 
beginnings of a workable legal architecture for IP that responds to the growth imperative that 
China now faces: to avoid economic stagnation, China must make innovation account for up to 
half of GDP growth by 2025.xii 
No study has yet determined the degree to which the experimental procedures of the 
BJIPC represent a departure from established practices or examined the degree to which the 
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changes proposed for the court are reflected in its actual decisions. To remedy this gap in the 
literature, this paper analyzes BJIPC case data to determine if and how reformers are innovating 
in the context of China’s IP regime and legal system in general. It finds that while the BJIPC 
reforms represent a step forward for an already above-average area of Chinese law, their real 
significance remains to be seen due to a developing understanding of how the reforms will 
impact the economy and encounter political obstacles if implemented on a broader scale. Still, 
because the BJIPC provides a functional model for legal capacity-building within China’s IP 
infrastructure, it holds tremendous promise for increasing consistency and openness in China’s 
legal system.  
The paper proceeds in three sections. Section 1 offers the legal background and history 
of the evolution of IP protection in China, explaining the development of the modern IP regime 
in three phases: legislation, enforcement, and utilization. It explains the paradox of statutory 
compliance without effective enforcement, arguing that while a transformation of China’s IP 
industry combined with US pressure to improve IP protection, leading to improvements in 
China’s statutory and judicial protections for IP, problems with bureaucratic organization and 
political demands prevented administrative enforcement from becoming maximally effective. 
Section 1’s sketches of the IP system’s development provide an expansive view of how the 
BJIPC fits into history, and set the stage for later discussions of current events.  
Section 2 details the goals and accomplishments of the BJIPC as an experimental 
program in IP law, elucidating the need, the plan, and the reality of the BJIPC. This section 
shows how the BJIPC aims to offer increased consistency, standardization, transparency, and 
openness in the Court’s decision-making with an eye towards using its work to revamp China’s 
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guiding cases system (GCS), which has had little impact since its introduction in 2010. It goes on 
to explain the practical considerations of how, exactly, the BJIPC has planned and executed the 
reforms using a combination of statistical data and examples from cases to identify and explain 
court procedures. It concludes that innovations in the court have generally followed the official 
plan, going beyond its goals in some respects, and underwhelming in others. While the BJIPC 
has pursued the specific implementation mechanisms of the plan with varying degrees of 
success, it has produced at least six major new innovations in IP law during its first two years of 
operation, and provides adjudication services that are procedurally fairer than average. The 
BJIPC is “plaintiff-friendly,” and strongly protects the intellectual property rights of private 
owners against infringers and administrative agencies alike. 
Section 3 examines the potential implications of the BJIPC reform within the context of 
China’s innovation economy and international trade issues, highlighting both domestic and 
international consequences. This section argues that IP is a relatively “safe” and beneficial area 
of law for reform because it stands out as a domain of commercial law that foreign and 
domestic firms both value highly, yet one in which political interests are relatively limited. This, 
along with the degree of control that the Chinese government can assert over the judicial 
impact of the IP court system as a whole, makes it a good candidate for rule of law reforms that 
“tie the autocrat’s hands” without disrupting the interests of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
leaders, who continue to control other domains of law. Finally, the BJIPC experiment has 
already provided a potential new direction for China’s case law system, and its procedural 
innovations may follow previous products of IP experiments into the next revisions of China’s 
intellectual property, administrative, and civil procedure laws.  
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The paper concludes with a reflection on how the BJIPC reforms fit in US-China trade 
relations, arguing that the US should see the BJIPC both as a credible signal of China’s 
commitment to IP protection and the fruit of sustained US cooperation with China to 
strengthen IP protections. In this framework, the US will benefit from acknowledging the BJIPCs 
significance with respect to China’s ongoing legal and economic development and 
understanding the court’s more general role in promoting the rule of law in China. 
 
Section 1: Background and History of Intellectual Property in the PRC 
 
In order to fully understand the significance of the BJIPC reforms, they must be situated within 
their legal and historical context. This section provides a brief overview of China’s political-legal 
system as it applies to IP before exploring the history of the IP legal system, focusing on the 
development of the current system from 1979 onwards. It aims to contextualize the 2014 
establishment of intellectual property courts (including the BJIPC) as logical extensions of 
historical and economic trends. 
 Before discussing China’s IP protection regime, some basic background on China’s 
legislative, executive, and judicial system is helpful. As a one-party state, China operates with a 
dual-power structure: politicians almost always hold positions in both the State (the PRC) and 
the Party (the CCP), and state power thus exists within a highly-centralized structure under the 
control of the CCP. The National People’s Congress (NPC) is China’s legislature. While all 2,987 
members are entitled to vote on legislation, legislation is introduced by the NPC Standing 
Committee (NPCSC), whose approximately 150 members follow the party line in passing 
legislation. Executive power is wielded by State Council, whose bodies include each of the 
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administrative agencies involved in enforcing and protecting intellectual property: The State 
Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), 
National Copyright Administration (NCA), General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ), and General Administration of Customs (GCA), The Public 
Security Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (PSB under MPS, the national law 
enforcement body charged with investigating criminal IPR violations) and other, minor 
executive agencies. These administrative agencies are empowered by law to conduct 
administrative enforcement of IPRs, a shorthand for extrajudicial remedies (such as confiscation 
and destruction of infringing goods, fines [of a relatively small magnitude], and so on) for IPR 
infringement. Administrative enforcement is usually faster and less costly than judicial 
enforcement, which is handled by the courts. However, as this paper will discuss later, 
administrative enforcement is much less effective.  
 China has a system of civil law loosely based on the earlier civil code of Germany. Unlike 
the German system to which it is often compared, while China has a constitution, it does not 
serve as a source of law in practice. The priority of various laws is determined instead by 
China’s Legislation Law. Courts lack the power of judicial review, though the Administrative 
Litigation Law (ALL, promulgated in 1994) provides limited powers of administrative review—
courts may legally invalidate specific acts of government agencies (such as those under the 
State Council). This power was modestly expanded by the 2014 amendments to the ALL, which 
grants the courts administrative review power over agency-generated rules under certain 
circumstances. The overwhelming majority of administrative review cases are tried in Beijing, 
which serves as the headquarters of all State Council agencies. 
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 China’s court system has four tiers (from least to most authoritative): Basic, 
Intermediate, High, and the Supreme People’s Court. Courts of special jurisdiction, including the 
Railway, Maritime, and Intellectual Property Courts, exist outside of this regime, and are usually 
equal in hierarchy to Basic or Intermediate courts. In Chinese legal terminology, the court that 
is first to hear a case is referred to as the “court of the first instance,” with the second and third 
following suit. As a general rule, Basic People’s Courts are the first instance courts for disputes, 
though, in the case of IP, intermediate people’s courts may also serve as first-instance courts 
for certain cases. According to the Organic Law, which governs the operation of China’s court 
system, most cases must be decided within two instances (i.e. they may only be appealed once 
to the next-highest level court), although certain civil and administrative cases may be heard a 
third time.xiii 
The modern system of intellectual property law in China began in 1979, the year that 
marked the start of Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening Up (ROU) policy. Because the 
enlightenment ideals that underpin the foundations of Western intellectual property law have 
no real counterparts in Chinese history, the concept of intellectual property law was introduced 
to China mostly by the Western powers.xiv While Chinese dynastic civilization did at various 
times protect what would have seemed to Western observers like intellectual property, the 
Chinese state never developed a homegrown analogue to the concept of intellectual property 
as the West conceives of it.xv    
The 29 years stretching from the founding of the PRC in 1949 to the end of the Cultural 
Revolution in 1976 roughly delineate a period of intense rejection of capitalism and the 
associated theories of private property and intellectual property in the PRC. According to Tian 
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Lipu, former commissioner of the State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), prior to 1980, the 
year that the PRC joined the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), “the concept of IP was 
almost unknown in China.”xvi During the early days of the PRC, Chinese leaders tried to 
reconcile a Soviet-style socialist IP policy with the realities of the IP regime left behind by the 
vanquished republican Guomindang (GMD—Nationalist Party) government. The elimination of 
private ownership by the mid 1950s, however, rendered these compromises needless.xvii The 
Anti-Rightist Movement (1957) and Great Leap Forward (1958-60) emaciated the PRC’s 
incipient intellectual property laws to practically nothing. National People’s Congress (NPC) 
legislators lost confidence in the “anti-socialist” tendencies that the system of intellectual 
property seemed to encourage, replacing them with Marxist award schemes that existed in the 
functional absence of patent law. xviii The property elements of the patent laws had been 
eradicated entirely by 1963.xix,  Intellectual property retrenchment only increased during the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-76). The granting of trademarks in the fledgling registration system 
ground to a halt as proletarian rhetoric crowded out the capitalist notions of property rights, 
including IP. A popular slogan sums up the period’s prevailing socialist attitude towards 
intellectual property protections: “Is it necessary for a steel worker to put his name on a steel 
ingot that he produces in the course of his duty? If not, why should a member of the 
intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what he produces?”xx 
 Shortly after Mao’s death and the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Deng Xiaoping 
began laying the groundwork for his ROU policy with the Four Modernizations: bringing China’s 
agriculture, industry, science and technology, and military affairs up to the cutting edge. As 
China’s leaders crafted a plan for reaching this goal, learning from the technological advances 
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of other countries became a central part of the ROU: purely socialist and isolationist policies 
were not enough to spur domestic innovation.  
China began a project to revive the little that remained of the old systems of intellectual 
property in 1977, although China’s leaders were fully cognizant of the fact that this was only to 
be an intermediate step in the development of a modernized system of intellectual property.xxi 
China’s first significant step towards the current regime was a trade agreement with the United 
States, forged in 1979. Article VI provided that the PRC recognize American intellectual 
property rights.xxii  This agreement marked the first time that the PRC entered into an 
international agreement to protect IP. Over the next four decades IPR development proceeded 
through three phases of focus: legislation (1980—Early-1990s), enforcement (Mid-1990s—Early 




 The first phase, legislation, began in 1979 with the US-PRC Trade Agreement. The agreement 
marked the first time that the PRC meaningfully agreed to protect intellectual property. In 1980, 
China joined the WIPO and thereby certified its intention to follow the international intellectual 
property regime. After joining the WIPO, NPC legislators crafted a statutory framework for 
intellectual property, passing patent, trademark, copyright, and unfair competition laws. The 
earliest of these preceded even the basic civil and administrative litigation laws, laying the 
foundations for a trend: China’s intellectual property system would paradoxically develop 
without a robust system of administrative, civil, or property law.xxiv Following its joining of the 
WIPO, the PRC immediately began passing legislation to bring itself in line with global standards. 
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A trademark law was passed in 1982, and, after a fierce debate, China passed its Patent law in 
1984, which granted inventors the rights to their innovations while not ignoring their broader 
responsibilities to the state.xxv Administrative Litigation, Civil Litigation, and Property laws did 
not arrive until 1989, 1990, and 2007, respectively. Each of these laws contributed to the IP 
protection regime, as shown in Table 1 (Infra). The compromise between socialist ideas of state 
centrism and capitalist notions of independent ownership became a mainstay of Chinese IP 
legislation during the first period of IP reform. 
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Table 1. IP-related Legislation and Amendments 
 
Title Date Description Administration Key Aspects of Amendments 
Trademark 
Law 
1982 Sets rules for the 
issuance, revocation, and 
protection of trademarks. 
SAIC, CTMO, 
TRAB 
1993: Advances additional protections and definition of Infringement. 
2001: Introduces of new judicial procedures (preliminary injunctions, evidence 
rules), 
2013: Increases damages, shortens timelines for CTMO and TRAB review, and 
adds internet-specific regulations alongside connections with international and 
WTO practice. 
Patent Law 1984 Sets rules for the 
issuance, revocation, and 
protection of patents. 
SIPO, PRB 1992: Expands scope and period of protection, adds domestic right of priority. 
2000: Allows judicial review of PRB; provides for TRIPS compliance; adds basis 
for damage calculation, right of sale, and preliminary injunctions. 
2008: Adds requirement of absolute inventiveness, streamlines approval of 
overseas patents, increases safeguards against malicious filing and litigation, 
eliminates statutory barriers for foreign filers. 
Copyright Law 1990 Sets rules for the 
issuance, revocation, and 
protection of copyright. 
NCA  2001: Adds in protection for digital and internet materials. 




1993 Sets rules to prevent 
commercial entities from 
competing unfairly. 




1989 Authorizes private suits 
against administrative 
organs and personnel for 
rights infringement. 
Courts 2014: Greatly expands the scope of actionable cases, augments enforceability 
of judgments against agencies. 
Civil Litigation 
Law 
1991 Sets rules and procedures 
for suits between private 
parties. 
Courts 2008: Facilitates retrial and appeal applications, increases the effectiveness of 
execution of judgments. 
2012: Improves efficiency and transparency, increases autonomy of parties, 
introduces new rules for third party rights, preliminary injunctions, etc. 
Property Law 2007 Governs creation, 
transfer, and ownership 
of all property. 




Of the three phases, legislation is the one perhaps most fraught with contradiction for IP: 
as the NPC crafted the first iteration of China’s first IP laws, the PRC was acquiring its reputation 
as the IP theft capital of the world. The period immediately following Deng’s opening up 
brought unprecedented prosperity to China. A Copyright law finally entered into force in 1990, 
and the unfair competition law came next in 1993 along with a trademark law amendment that 
further solidified brand protections. But without any effective IP enforcement infrastructure in 
place, infringement flourished. For instance, even while the 1992 revisions to China’s patent 
law brought the PRC’s statutory law into full compliance with the requirements of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS),  in 1995, the ratio of pirated to licensed software in China was 
50:1. xxvi xxvii  While China focused on improving enforcement in the next stage of the 
development of its IP protection system, problems with enforcement dog China to this day. 
From the mid-1980s to the end of the legislation phase in the early-1990s, China 
acceded to nearly all of the WIPO-administered treaties on intellectual property, and sent 
delegations of legislators and judges abroad in order to learn other countries’ judicial practices 
on IP cases. xxviii  While China’s statutory IP protection regime generally coincided with 
international norms by the end of the legislation phase, enforcement was almost nonexistent. 
The beginning of the second phase, enforcement, is marked by China’s aspiration to World 
Trade Organization (WTO) accession. In this period, the PRC invested heavily in harmonizing its 
statutory legal system with international norms and developing a professionalized IP 
administrative and judiciary apparatus to deal with increasingly complex cases and a 






As China struggled to enforce its laws, domestic favoritism and weak administrative 
enforcement made foreign IP firms loath to do business in China. During the late eighties and 
early nineties, rampant IP theft in China caused an average annual loss of over $2 Billion to US 
firms alone.xxix These losses, among other trade issues, prompted both the H.W. Bush and 
Clinton administrations to adopt a coercive approach to negotiation, repeatedly threatening 
China with sanctions, trade wars, nonrenewal of most favored nation (MFN) status, and 
opposition to China’s WTO accession.xxx 
Because of continued pressure from the US and China’s aspirations to join the WTO, the 
beginning of China’s focus on enforcement began in the mid-1990s as China gradually 
abandoned the earlier compromise between socialist, statist ideals and the need for private 
intellectual property to spur investment and innovation. Instead, China moved more or less 
unidirectionally towards a western-style IP regime. The enforcement era began in the early 
nineties, with the first trademark law amendment in 1993. The amendment, along with the 
other amendments to IP laws that would follow both before and after China’s WTO accession, 
acknowledged a need to respond to US  pressure for better IP enforcement.xxxi In the 1995 US-
China agreement on IPR enforcement, further clarifying this relationship.xxxii From 1995, China 
added several new protections for intellectual property, including the establishment of the SIPO 
in 1998, which provided an analogue to the US Patent and Trademark Office, adopting 
comparable patent review and approval procedures.xxxiii In 1999, the value of wholly-foreign-
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owned companies overtook that of enterprise joint ventures (EJVs) between Chinese and 
foreign enterprises, a culminating mark of a two-decade long push towards opening up.xxxiv  
Paradoxically, the same pressure that encouraged China to improve its statutory IP 
regime and court system contributed to the continuing failure of administrative enforcement to 
be effective. Leading up to and following World Trade  accession, China launched several high-
profile crackdowns on infringing goods, which continue to this day. While this administrative 
enforcement is highly politicized, inconsistent, largely campaign-based, and does little to 
actually change infringers’ behavior, it serves an important propagandistic purpose to 
supplement the slow progress of legal reform during this period. Unlike courts, campaign-style 
administrative enforcement (most commonly by Customs as well as the State Intellectual 
Property Office [SIPO], the National Copyright Administration [NCA], and the State 
Administration on Industry and Commerce [SAIC]) can respond quickly to foreign pressure; 
despite the inferiority of this type of enforcement, its political and diplomatic role in responding 





Figure 1. Timeline of China’s Intellectual Property Law 
 
 
1979 • Reform and Opening Up Begins
• US-PRC Agreement on Trade Relations
1980 • PRC joins the WIPO
1982
• Trademark Law Adopted
• SAIC Established (in current form)
1984
• Patent Law Adopted
1985
• PRC accedes to Paris Convention
1989
• PRC accedes to Madrid Agreement
• Administrative Litigation Law Adopted
1990
• Copyright Law Adopted
1991
• Civil Litigation Law Adopted
1992
• US-PRC MOU on IPR
• PRC accedes to UCC and Berne 
Conventions
• First Patent Law Amendment
1993
• Unfair Competition Law
• First Trademark Law Amendment
• First IP Tribunals (BJ)
1994
• PRC acedes to Patent Cooperation 
Treaty
• TRIPS (WTO) negotiated
1995




• Second Patent Law Ammendment
2001
• PRC accedes to the WTO, TRIPS
• Second Trademark Law Amendment
• First Copyright Law Amendment
2007
• Property Law Adopted
• First Civil Litigation Law Amendment
2008
• Third Patent Law Amendment
• NIPS promulgated
2009
• Domestic firms receive more SIPO 
patents than foreign firms for the first 
time
2010
• Latest SIPO patent enforcement 
guidelines.
• 1M Overseas Patents at SIPO
• Second Copyright Law Amendment
2013
• Third Trademark Law Amendment
• Second Civil Litigation Law 
Amendment
2014
• IP Courts Established (BJ, SH, GZ)
• First Administrative Litigation Law 
Amendment
2015
• China overtakes the US in annual 
patent grants to claim the #1 spot.
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During the enforcement period, amendments to IP legislation brought China’s statutory 
regime into nearly full compliance with WTO rules. At the same time, China dedicated a great 
deal of resources towards improving enforcement of IPRs. As a result, agencies’ capacity to 
issue and inspect IPRs increased tremendously (Figure 3, Infra). But, despite these efforts, 
administrative agencies emerged from the period still unable to provide rationalized 
enforcement (enforcement that is consistent, transparent, and procedurally fair) of IPRs.xxxvi 
While the volume of enforcement of administrative agencies (as measured by the 
number of enforcement actions) increased during the enforcement period, its effectiveness did 
not. The reasons for this perplexing failure, first explained in a landmark, 327-page study of IP 
enforcement in China by Martin Dimitrov, were threefold.xxxvii First, while mechanisms for 
bureaucratic accountability exist, they are ineffective and therefore there is no strong 
mechanism to hold agencies to task for failures to enforce effectively. Second, decentralization 
and overlapping mandates of enforcement agencies exacerbate these problems of 
accountability. Third, agencies have repeatedly been co-opted by the government in order to 
respond to external pressures for IP-enforcement, resulting in ineffective, campaign-style 
enforcement that is of high quantity and low quality. As a result of these three factors, while 
certain exceptions exist, the non-judicial enforcement remedies offered by administrative 
agencies in China are generally not rationalized, and therefore ineffective.  
In the legal realm, reform efforts were much more successful, as increased 
specialization of IP courts formed the backbone of the new IP protection regime. As an area of 
law, intellectual property requires an extremely high degree of both judicial professionalism 
and specialized knowledge. China’s first significant step towards this professionalism was the 
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establishment of the specialized IP tribunals within existing people’s courts. During the previous 
legislation period, poorly-trained, nonspecialized judges frequently handed down arbitrary 
opinions of IP matters that were not released publically and, as a general rule, could not be 
appealed.xxxviii As Beijing aspired to WTO accession and stepped up enforcement, the first such 
tribunals were established in 1993, in the Beijing Intermediate and High People’s Courts, and 
the SPC’s tribunal was established soon thereafter.xxxix These tribunals had unprecedented 
levels of transparency, with open courts and high appeals rates, a marker of at least a modicum 
of procedural fairness.xl Delegations from the tribunals made frequent visits to courtrooms in 
the United States and Europe, gleaning knowledge that they would bring back to China.  
Compared to administrative enforcement agencies, IP tribunals were able to handle 
enforcement in the more even-handed and less politicized fashion. Their ability to do so 
resulted from the lack of pressure upon them to enforce IPRs and that their jurisdictional and 
enforcement mandates were more clearly delineated than most of the agencies’.xli By 2013, 
there were nearly over 400 such tribunals across China; the number grew to over 560 in the 
very next year.xlii The tribunals not only provided judicial resources for exponentially expanding 
IP Caseloads (Figures 2 and 3, Infra) but supplied the legal system with several new innovations. 
Preliminary injunctions, burden of proof reversals, and punitive damages all emerged in the 
judgments of IP tribunals long before NPC legislators included these judicial tools in the 2007 
and 2012 revisions to the Civil Procedure Law.  The five types of enforcement available to IP 
rights holders, including judicial enforcement by the courts, are summarized in Table 2 (Infra). 
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DESCRIPTION PROVIDED BY IS IT RATIONALIZED? 
JUDICIAL Administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings 
conducted in accordance with applicable laws. 




Yes, or at least more so than other forms, and especially 
in the case of the BJIPC. 
QUASI-JUDICIAL A hearing reminiscent of a court procedure 
conducted by an administrative agency. It may 
result in a written punishment decision. Caseloads 
are generally comparable to those of the courts 
and tribunals combined. (Patent and Copyright 
only) 
SIPO, NCAC Generally not. Proceedings are run by agencies 
themselves, with little direct oversight from central 
government, and decisions are not published. While 
decisions may be appealed in principle, they are difficult 
to contest in practice. SIPO procedures, in recent years, 
have emerged as a notable example to this general rule 
RAIDS IPR holders may complain to an agency of a 
Trademark infringement, which may then conduct 
a raid. (Trademark only). 
SAIC, GAC, 
PSB 
No. Enforcement agencies regularly refuse to organize a 
raid, often taking advantage of jurisdictional overlap to 
do so. Even when raids are conducted, infringing goods 




Agencies conduct routine inspections on 
businesses for suspected IPR violations. (Dominant 
enforcement mode for trademarks, but exists for 





No. Enforcement is incidental to other duties, e.g. only 
1% of routine SAIC inspections encounter violations.xliv 
Even when case is processed, it is handled in a completely 




Sweeps of intense enforcement lasting no more 
than a few weeks, often coordinated by the 
central government, and often involving 
collaboration between multiple agencies. 





No. These types of enforcement are responses to “crisis 
situations.” Because the multiple agencies involved have 
overlapping enforcement mandates, campaigns are 
farcically uncoordinated and duplicative, often with 
agencies reporting the same case several times and 
imposing multiple fines for the same alleged offense. 
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While foreign pressure played an important role, both the statutory changes and the 
introduction of the rationalized enforcement mechanisms of the IP tribunals during the 
enforcement stage were prompted primarily by economic development. In the mid-nineties, 
China’s IP-intensive industries reached an inflection point in their growth. China’s leaders began 
to see IP not merely as a means of increasing foreign direct investment (FDI), but as a means for 
protecting and encouraging the development of homegrown R&D. xlv  Economic evidence 
indicates two key factors at play: a trade-supporting market expansion effect and a trade-
inhibiting market concentration effect.xlvi First, Chinese patent grants to foreign firms are 
positively correlated with export volume of those firms to China; second, increased domestic 
patent-holder concentration in an industry has a negative relationship with export volume of 
foreign firms to China.xlvii In the periods before WTO accession, China’s domestic IP-intensive 
industries had experienced unprecedented growth. For instance, the value of China’s software 
industry in the late nineties doubled every year, with software patents nearly quintupling 
during the period (Figure 2, Infra).xlviii The integrated circuit industry enjoyed a similar explosion, 
with output growing by 30% annually, alongside a roughly corresponding increase in domestic 
patent grants.xlix The increased concentration and market expansion effects in IP-intensive 
industries combined to increase the volume of trade while simultaneously increasing the 
benefits and decreasing the drawback of IP protection for Chinese firms. As local firms and 
owners increasingly had reasons to support better protection of intellectual property, the 
Chinese government had a strong incentive to support the expansion of IPR and to create a 






























In the 22 years between the beginning of Deng’s Reforms (1987) and China’s eventual accession 
to the WTO (2000), China built a comprehensive, if imperfect, IP framework that has continued 
to evolve. While initially rooted in socialist ideals, by the time of its WTO accession, China had 
placed itself squarely on the trajectory towards the western private-property style model of IP. 
During the utilization phase, the nation began to shift its focus from persistently problematic 
enforcement system that concentrated on compliance with WTO norms with an eye towards 
protecting foreign IP owners towards a system that promoted homegrown intellectual 
production even in the absence of maximally effective enforcement. 
Since China’s WTO accession, the path of Chinese IP legal regime has continued to 
parallel the development of China’s IP-intensive industry, subject to the constraints of 
developing legal systems. Each revision of the Patent and Trademark laws have brought them 
closer into harmony with their US and EU counterparts, though significant differences still 
exist.liii As it stands today, Chinese IP legislation shares many similarities with western systems, 
and is fully statutorily compliant with the TRIPS agreement.  In 2009, China passed a property 
law, which, in a certain sense, marked the end of the era of quasi-socialist-capitalist 
compromise. 
China’s current reforms in intellectual property are guided by the 2008 National 
Intellectual Property Strategy (NIPS), a State Council directive which aims to increase the share 
of IP-intensive industries as a percentage of GDP by crafting IP policy that incentivizes both 
homegrown innovation and international exchange of IP.liv In order to accomplish this, NIPS 
emphasizes that China must develop IP enforcement mechanisms that are economically 
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efficient, adaptive, and judicially consistent. As the guiding document for the utilization phase, 
NIPS puts forward the strategic goal that “by 2020, China will be a country with high levels of 
intellectual property rights creation, application, protection and management.” lv It goes on to 
immediately highlight the “legal environment,” “market entities” and “public awareness” (in 
that order) as three pillars towards achieving this goal.lvi Three of the five “Strategic Focuses” of 
the NIPS (“1. Improving the Intellectual Property Regime,” “3. Strengthening the Protection of 
IPRs,” and “4. Preventing Abuses of IPRs”) are dedicated to guiding judicial reform in IP, setting 
forward nonspecific, goal-based directives for national progress in IP by 2020. lvii Current legal 
reform in IP, including the BJIPC experiment, utilizes NIPS as a touchstone for generating and 
evaluating plans for reforms. In short, the NIPS makes emphatically clear that China’s leaders 
see the courts as the central part of their national IP strategy.   
By the time that China’s growth slowdown became clear in the first decade of the 2000s, 
its leaders had already recognized that the China’s economy must move towards innovation to 
avoid economic torpor. The two major economic drivers of China’s economic growth over the 
preceding three decades—heavy-duty capital investment and labor force expansion—were 
grinding and screeching to a halt. To avoid further economic stagnation in the near future, 
innovation must make up half of China’s GDP growth by 2025—an annual value of $3 trillion to 
$5 trillion per year.lviii Already, China’s R&D spending has been growing by an astonishing 18.3% 
annually, almost precisely the same rate as its IP case docket over the same time period. At 
over $200 billion per year, it is now second in amount only to the United States.lix Today, China 
leads the world in patent applications and produces nearly 30,000 PhDs in science and 
engineering each year.lx While China lags behind in some measures of innovation, such as 
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biotechnology and commercial aviation, it has made enormous leaps ahead of the United States 
in other IP-intensive areas, such as railroad technology and solar panels, where the government 
has actively spurred innovation through market creation, pro-cluster policy, and other pro-
innovation measures. In order to further develop its innovation economy, however, China must 
not only continue to boost utilization of IPRs though spending policy, but also by creating an 
effective enforcement mechanism for IPRs centered around a fair, consistent, and efficient legal 
system. 
Taking a view of China’s IP enforcement system as a whole, the reason that the NIPS 
focuses so much on legal enforcement as opposed to administrative enforcement is relatively 
obvious: the latter has not worked. Historically, China’s administrative enforcement bodies 
(with the partial exception of the newer SIPO) have operated under pressure from the 
government and foreign entities to enforce IPRs without establishing workable mechanisms for 
accountability, clearly delineated areas of responsibility, or even bureaucratic channels to 
ensure that enforcement adheres to applicable laws and regulations.lxi Companies, especially 
those based overseas, rarely if ever seek administrative enforcement of IPRs because of these 
issues with administrative enforcement and the fact that, unlike courts, agencies can only stop 
infringement, and cannot award monetary damages.lxii  Because these problems are deeply 
embedded in the centralized structure of the Chinese state, it is far easier to address the 
problems of IP enforcement by focusing on the court system, which is relatively free from the 
political pressure to enforce (compared to administrative agencies, at least), has clearly defined 
areas of jurisdiction, and can serve as a costly but effective check on government agencies 
through administrative litigation.lxiii 
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As it exists today, China’s IP regime is a mixed story. On the one hand, revolutionary 
statutory changes have propelled the PRC into full compliance with TRIPS and WTO norms, at 
least on paper. But, as always, the devil is in the details: deeply problematic administrative 
enforcement alongside a generally inefficient and expensive court system that lacks judgmental 
consistency, professionalism, and expertise continue to present problems for China’s legal 
system in IP and beyond. For some of these problems, the BJIPC experiment could provide 
solutions. The next section describes how the BJIPC reforms fit into both the NIPS and the 
current epoch of development in intellectual property law in the PRC. 
 
Section 2: Innovation in the BJIPC 
 
This section details the emergence of the BJIPC and scrutinizes its practices in order to elucidate 
its role within the reform of both the IP regime and legal system in three parts. First, it explains 
how the BJIPC and other intellectual property courts came to be, and what needs its creation 
was intended to address. Second, it lays out and examines reformers’ goals and intentions for 
the BJIPC, showing how the court was designed to respond to needs both in IP specifically and 
in the legal system more generally. Finally, it analyzes the realities of the BJIPC during its first 
2.5 years of operation (December 2014 – April 2017) using a hybrid approach that combines 
aggregate numerical data with specific case studies, highlighting several ways that the BJIPC has 
innovated in the practice of IP law, meeting some of its goals while falling short on others. The 
BJIPC has developed at least six innovative procedures, and has positioned itself as a staunch 
defender of IPRs. While it is too early to tell how durable or significant the reforms may turn 
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out to be, the court’s work so far provides very encouraging signs for the prospects of China’s IP 




From its beginnings, the establishment of the BJIPC experiment served needs in two general 
areas: (1) IPR enforcement and dispute adjudication, which has involved each of the three new 
courts (in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, respectively), and (2) developing innovative 
procedures to guide legal reform, which is specific to the BJIPC. While these two categories of 
needs are not necessarily discrete in practice, discussing them separately is useful because it 
shows how the BJIPC procedures were crafted to respond to them. 
The first category of needs was the primarily the product of historical trends. As the 
utilization phase progressed, China as a whole saw exponential increases in both IP production 
(Figure 1, Supra) and IP litigation (Figure 2, Supra). IP tribunals around China had been 
struggling under dockets that grew larger ever year. From 1986-2003, caseloads grew quickly 
but manageably, with an average annual growth rate of 16%. But from 2004-2013, the average 
growth rate rose to 30% per year.lxiv The strain was especially great in the regions of Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong (Figure 4, infra), whose IP caseloads comprised 55% of the national 
total.lxv While the rapid increase in tribunals (an incredible 40% increase to 410 between 2013 
and 2014 alone) had likewise increased professionalization across geographical areas and had 
somewhat alleviated the flood of first instance IP cases in appellate courts (which were 
generally the first to have IP tribunals and therefore served as courts of the first instance of IP 
cases), additional resources were needed in the high-volume Civil IP jurisdictions, including 
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Guangdong (#1), Beijing (#3, after Zhejiang Province), and Shanghai (#7, after Jiangsu, Shandong, 
and Hebei provinces).lxvi 
 A second portion of the IP-specific need came from the requirement for increased 
accountability for administrative agencies and more consistent judgment. This was greatest in 
Beijing, which, as the center of government, hosts the lion’s share of China’s administrative 
docket. As mentioned in the previous section, China’s administrative enforcement of IPRs has 
been extremely ineffective, with inefficient corruption-prone campaign-style and routine 
enforcement dominating a mess of overlapping mandates that prevent bureaucratic 
accountability (Table 2, supra). Against this backdrop, the IP tribunals were an important step in 
that they allowed China to carve out an area of more effective “model enforcement” within the 
court system instead of taking on the much more difficult task of creating and effective 
administrative enforcement bureaucracy. However, the fact that IP tribunals were parts of 
larger courts made it more difficult for these courts to focus specifically on IP, since the justices 
on the tribunals had to contend with the other demands implied by participating in an 
established institution.lxvii  IP Tribunals simply did not have the flexibility demanded by NIPS to 
quickly create and implement innovative adjudication procedures.lxviii 
In addition to goals related to IP specifically, the BJIPC experiment was also intended as 
a response to the lackluster results of the Guiding Cases System (GCS), which was first 
introduced in 2010. Eight times since, the SPC has promulgated sets of around ten cases each 
that it deems as models, appropriate for judges to cite as compelling authority in their 
reasoning when making decisions.lxix When the SPC issued the first batch of Guiding Cases in 
2011, they were initially met with great fanfare from international observers. China’s system of 
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civil law, unlike the common-law system that originated in Britain and spread throughout its 
colonies, does not respect stare decisis, the common-law principle that precedent may be 
binding on subsequent cases. This differentiates it tremendously from not only the British and 
American systems, but also from the German, French, and Japanese systems of civil law, all of 
which have well-documented mechanism that carve out a role for case law in legal decision-
making. While case law has long been cited by litigants in the courtroom, before the guiding 
case reform in 2010, Chinese judges were not allowed to use any cases as compelling authority, 
although more informal mechanisms that resemble case law operated in the courtroom long 
before the debut of the GCS. lxx As it promulgated the first guiding cases, the SPC announced 
the system’s necessity to “handle similar cases similarly” and fill the gaps in statutory law. Many 
observers and commentators hoped that the GCS would usher in an era of greater consistency 
and, therefore, fairness in China’s judicial process. 
As of 2017, the SPC has released 87 guiding cases, 23% (20) of which concern 
intellectual property law.lxxi But the on-the-ground impact of the system in actual subsequent 
cases has been very limited. In all of China, judges cited guiding cases only 181* times from Q1 
2014 to Q4 2015, and nearly half of these references were to a single case (#24), which 
established the “eggshell skull rule” in tort law.lxxii Half of all cases, and nearly two thirds of 
those related to intellectual property law, were not cited at all. lxxiii Despite their great promise, 
the percentage of Chinese cases that have cited guiding cases can be measured as thousandths 
of a percentage point.lxxiv 
                                                      
* Other studies have found up to 241 cases; either way, this figure is a drop in the bucket when 
compared to the enormous national docket. See: Jeremy Daum, “The Curious Case of China’s 




There are several reasons why guiding cases have been cited at such an abysmally low 
rate, and they have likely worked in concert to produce the effect. First, China’s judiciary, itself 
relatively new, is trained almost entirely within a civil law tradition that does not easily 
accommodate the citing of any precedent. In 2014, 4 years after the GCS was started, over 40% 
of 500 basic and intermediate court judges surveyed in a city in Southern China that received an 
SPC commendation for fairness and efficiency in judgment admitted that they had still not read 
the SPC’s 2010 provisions on the guiding case system.lxxv The legal system has gone through a 
flurry of changes in the last few decades, and it has evidently proven difficult for courts to keep 
up with rapidly developing judicial tools, especially considering that the majority of judges in 
China hold only a bachelor’s degree, or, in less prosperous areas, no degree at all.lxxvi  
Second, the narrow scope of the GCS and the lack of comprehensiveness across the 
body of guiding cases means that it is rare for judges to have the opportunity cite them. Even 
when this opportunity exists, the one-off nature of guiding cases, which are the sole 
representative of what would be an entire body of case law in a common-law tradition, means 
that subsequent cases are very easy to distinguish form any given guiding case. Judges 
themselves provide the paucity of cases as the most common reason why they did not cite 
guiding cases, with 65% of judges who did not consider guiding cases in adjudication saying that 
they did so because none of the guiding cases published concerned the areas of law that they 
adjudicated.lxxvii  
Third, even in cases where this opportunity does present itself, lawyers unfamiliar with 
the cases may not cite them. Most of the time, advocates stick to the statutory and substantive 
issues at hand. Fourth, aggregate court data shows that lawyers are nearly three times more 
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likely to refer to guiding cases than judges, suggesting that judges may feel that they don’t need 
to include precedent-based decisions in written judgments, even if the arguments help to 
support their decision.lxxviii 
 Finally, when judges do reference guiding cases, they almost never quote or reference 
them explicitly. Because the cases don’t have any true legal authority, but only “guiding” 
significance, there’s not much of a reason to do so. In 2014, none of the 500 judges surveyed 
who had referenced guiding cases had referenced the cases with attribution to the source, with 
all of them referring to a case either obliquely or by quoting from the guiding case decision 
without a citation. In the year before, only 2% of judges said that they had explicitly referenced 
a guiding case. 
China’s leaders have not let the weaknesses in the GCS go unnoticed. At the Fourth 
Plenum of the Eighteenth Party Congress, held just before the announcement of the Intellectual 
Property Courts’ establishment in 2014, officials highlighted the need “to strengthen and 
standardize judicial interpretation and case guidance and harmonize the applicable legal 
standards,”lxxix building on the slightly more concrete proposal of the Third Plenum to “explore 
the establishment of a special court for intellectual property rights.”lxxx  
Experiments in intellectual property were nothing new—they had long served as a 
means for Chinese jurists and legislators to test out and gauge the impact of new legal policy. 
As one of the most complex areas of law, IP has demanded both specialized legal background 
and technical expertise. The concentration of expert jurists in the IP Tribunals (IPTs) that have 
historically handled these cases alongside the high degree of specialization within this field of 
law have made intellectual property a natural venue for judicial experimentation in China. IP 
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litigation has paved the way for the introduction of myriad judicial tools that were later 
incorporated into other aspects of the Chinese judicial system, including preliminary injunctions, 
punitive damages, and burden of proof reversals.lxxxi  
 A major task for China’s next legal innovation would be to establish the BJIPC as an 
institutional mechanism for exploring how to improve upon the GCS, providing a new mode of 
“case law with Chinese Characteristics.” What the plenums’ proclamations lacked in specific 
guidance, they made up for by giving reformers in the NPC and the SPC a broad mandate for 
tweaking this system of case law until it served its intended purpose of making China’s judicial 




Following the directives of the Third and Fourth Plenums, the NPC and SPC set to work on 
crafting a court experiment that would address both the strain of the IP tribunals and the woes 
of the GCS. Expanding the tribunals made little sense, given that most of them were located in 
areas with low volumes of IP litigation; in China, IP has one of the most uneven distributions of 
civil and administrative caseloads, with over half of all cases in just three jurisdictions. lxxxii As 
mentioned, the tribunals, as parts of larger courts, lacked the institutional agility and flexibility 
to experiment with new procedures. Instead, the NPC established three pilot intellectual 
property courts (IPCs), in Beijing (BJIPC), Shanghai (SHIPC), and Guangzhou (GZIPC), respectively 
(Figure 4, Infra). Each court would have jurisdiction over the municipality in which it was 
located, while the GZIPC would have additional jurisdiction over the entire province of 
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Guangdong, which edges out Beijing as the province-level administrative division with China’s 
largest IP docket. 
Figure 4. China’s Three Intellectual Property Courts 
 
Together, the three jurisdictions encompass over half of China’s entire IP docket. 
 
Since the IP courts were intended to alleviate the glut of civil (and administrative in the 
case of the BJIPC) cases, the new IP courts did not have criminal jurisdiction, reversing the 
“three-in-one” approach of the tribunals.lxxxiii Their independence from the rest of the court 
system allows them to act as courts of both first- and second- instance. Specifically, Article 1 of 
the SPC Provisions on the Jurisdiction of the Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou Intellectual 
Property Courts granted the new courts original jurisdiction over all IP cases in their 
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jurisdictions that presented special legal challenges, including (a) civil IP cases involving patents, 
trade secrets and other technical cases; (b) all IP-related administrative cases involving the 
State Council department or the local people's government at or above the county level; and (c) 
civil cases involving well-known trademarks.lxxxiv Therefore, the provisions imply that local court 
tribunals continue to handle copyright, trademark, and other uncomplicated IP cases Each of 
the three IP courts has original jurisdiction over IP-related administrative review cases and 
more technical civil IP cases in its district. Article 6 gives the courts have second-instance 
jurisdiction over all IP cases in their districts.lxxxv Figure 5 (Infra) shows how the introduction of 
the IP courts has changed the civil and administrative IP litigation environment in China. 
Compared to the other courts, the BJIPC has far more political significance due primarily 
to its location in Beijing and its greatly expanded powers of administrative case review. Article 5 
granted the BJIPC was granted additional first-instance jurisdiction over all IP administrative 
decisions of central State Council bodies, such as the SAIC and SIPO. This means that the BJIPC 
is the first court to hear any complaints against China’s national IP regulators (SIPO, SAIC, etc.), 
and is therefore the most important court for administrative accountability for IP in the country. 
Interestingly, in this role, the BJIPC replaces the Beijing Intermediate People’s Court, the site of 
China’s first ever dedicated IP tribunal, established in 1993. The court’s jurisdiction over Beijing 
means that the BJIPC is an indispensable part of any analysis of the international significance of 
China’s IP law, since it currently tries approximately 80% of the cases in China’s combined civil 
and administrative docket that involve a foreign party.lxxxvi 
Its administrative jurisdiction and location alone make the BJIPC worthy of heightened 
attention, but the SPC revolutionized the BJIPC even further by making it the site of an 
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experiment in case law. Nearly three years after the BJIPC’s establishment, the document that 
outlines the parameters of this experiment, “Beijing IP Court Case Guidance Work Trial 
Measures (Draft),” (“BCGM”) has yet to be approved for public release, and remains 
confidential, along with several other guiding documents relating to the court’s procedures.lxxxvii  
However, two researchers from the China Institute of Applied Jurisprudence (an 
academic division of the SPC) who are directly guiding the BJIPC experiment, Jiang Huiling and 
Yang Yi, have outlined its goals in publically available documents. Although the authors mix the 
contents of the BCGM with their own opinions and ideas to a certain degree, their article is 
generally clear in delineating the two, with only a few points of ambiguity. According to them 
“the reform attempts to explore and test the intellectual property case guidance system with 
Chinese characteristics, gradually standardize the adjudication of IPRs, deepen judicial public 
disclosure rights of IPRs, gather the judicial wisdom of IPRs, promote the unified application of 
intellectual property law, enhance the judicial credibility of intellectual property rights, and 
promote the judicial communication and research on intellectual property law.”lxxxviii Several of 
these goals, particularly “gather the judicial wisdom of IPRs,” strongly suggest the reformers’ 
hope that the case guidance system that eventually emerges from the BJIPC experiment may 
eventually produce nationally-reproducible judicial standards, thereby following the historical 
precedent of how experiments in IP planted the seeds of several innovations in broader areas 
Chinese law.  
Jiang and Yang outline four primary goals of the BJIPC reforms. First, the court should 
become a center for building the “theoretical construction and basis” of intellectual property 
case guidance. The practical significance of this goal to IP litigation is probably limited, with the 
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exception that a commitment to “theory” in such a practical setting may indicate that reforms 
aim to set national standards.  
Second, the BJIPC reform seeks to increase “informatization” and “openness” in the 
system of IP law.lxxxix Specifically, the BJIPC plan for these goals spans five years. 2015, the first 
year, is set aside for the “establishment of the research base,” including the logistics of hiring, 
forming various committees, and laying down a bureaucracy to support the court’s activities 
and reforms. In 2016 and 2017, the court was to and will work to establish a public IP law 
database at the BJIPC that connects the SHIPC and the GZIPC to their Beijing counterpart, which 
will be uploaded before the end of the two-year period and enhanced with various search and 
screening tools. In 2018 and 2019, the database will be extended across Chinese courts and 
then linked with international databases. These goals, if realized, could meaningfully increase 
ease of access to court information and data manipulation, though all judgments (except those 
that are sealed or otherwise exempted from the public record) are theoretically available 
through existing SPC databases. In turn, increased access to information could lead to more 
consistent rulings and fairer trials, as litigants and judges alike could enter the courtroom with 
more information on prior litigation and a deeper understanding of the issues at stake in a 
given case.  
Finally, and probably most importantly, the court aims to increase standardization 
across cases. This has been an enormous issue that the GCS attempted and so far failed to 
address, and is critical to the broader impact of the BJIPC. Jiang and Yang indicate several 
mechanisms though which the court will achieve its aims of standardization. Most significantly, 
Article 7 of The BCGM establishes a nine-tiered ranking of influence of decisions.xc While SPC-
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designated guiding cases are the most persuasive source of legal precedent, the hierarchy 
includes every level of the Chinese court system. Surprisingly, it reserves the bottom rung for 
“extraterritorial precedent,” raising the tantalizing possibility that a BJIPC judge could, in theory, 
legitimately cite a US or EU court ruling in a legal decision.  
Accompanying these primary goals, Jiang and Yang also explain the nature of “The 
Innovative Application of ‘Precedent Judgments’” that the BJIPC aims to achieve. They 
emphasize that BJIPC judges will establish the status of precedent without invoking the usual 
notions of “binding-ness” that could “shake the legal system.” In the BJIPC, they assert, 
precedent will not begin as part of the content of the law per se, but rather a system of 
“supplementation” that serves three purposes: explaining the law where it is unclear or 
contains loopholes; supplementing the law where the law creates conflict; and harmonizing the 
law by creating regulations in areas in which the law does not explicitly provide for them. 
Precedent gains a “de facto binding” effect as a matter of practice because, if two judgments 
conflict, this could serve as the grounds for an appeal or a retrial. Therefore, judges have a 
strong reason to defer to prior judgment. This is where the nine-tier hierarchy of precedent 
comes in, since it provides a framework for organizing the persuasiveness of precedent from 
differing sources.  
Finally, Jiang and Yang outline four ideas about how BJIPC judges will support the 
Court’s system of precedent-based judgments. First, BJIPC judgments will include an expanded 
discussion of the substantive facts of the case as the court and each of the parties has 
determined them, the legal rules and application of law, and identification and discussion of 
any applicable precedents. Second, BJIPC judges’ thinking on precedent will be cultivated such 
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that precedential authority is seen not as a “given,” but rather as the “long-term accumulation” 
of authority, the product of the gradual formation of a sort of jurisprudential “inertia.” Third, 
litigation in the BJIPC will take advantage of the database and the other informatization 
initiatives. Fourth, the BJIPC will establish a system for the overruling of precedent by 
establishing standards that exercise “a considerable degree of caution” when deciding to 
overturn precedent. Overturning precedent must be based on a transformation of values over 
time, and must involve a “special regulatory mechanism.” Jiang and Yang suggest the 
submission of the precedent overturning decision to a higher court as one such mechanism, 
though it is not clear if this is their own commentary or part of the actual plan as outlined in the 
BCGM. The table below summarizes the goals of the BJIPC. 
Table 3. Stated Goals of the BJIPC 
Developing IP Theory
• Public Database
• Disclosure of Rulings
• Advanced Data and Search Tools
Informatization and Openness
• Expanded opinions
• Precedent-based reasoning drawing from all court levels
• Utilizing informatization and data tools










As of April 2017, the BJIPC has been in operation for nearly 2.5 years, and has tried thousands 
of cases, handling about 10% of China’s IP total docket each year, including nearly all 
administrative IP cases.xci The court currently has 44 judges with an average age of 40. All but 4 
hold masters’ degrees or higher. As has long been the tradition in the IP tribunals, the judges on 
the BJIPC represent the most qualified in the nation, and have a reputation among lawyers for 
being “tech savvy and plaintiff-friendly.”xcii 
Presumably, the court has been following the goals set forth by the SPC, NPC, and the 
3rd and 4th Plenums of CCP, both in terms of improving China’s protection of intellectual 
property and in providing a way forward for the ailing GCS. Of course, the ultimate question 
beyond whether or not the BJIPC is fulfilling its goals is whether the court’s procedures are 
conducive to a greater level of fairness and economic efficiency than before. In order to arrive 
at this question, we must examine how exactly BJIPC judges are innovating with IP law and then 
scrutinize whether these changes are a positive development for both innovators (in relation to 
the protection of IP) and the rule of law in general (in relation to the GCS and the broader 
question of how to incorporate case law into China’s legal decision-making process). 
But, since any evaluation of the BJIPC’s performance depends on the court’s 
transparency and the quality of the data it releases, it is useful to begin by evaluating the 
BJIPC’s commitment to informatization and openness, a central goal of the reforms. In general, 
the court’s operation has been unusually transparent. Fulfilling its mission as a quasi-academic 
enterprise, it has hosted several seminars for academics and practitioners.xciii, xciv As promised, 
the court has publically released its rulings through a variety of databases—but it has yet to 
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establish its own. This makes accessing court data rather difficult. The SPC’s China Court 
Monitor, which theoretically should include all court decisions in China, only had 2,801 BJIPC 
cases in its database from the year 2015, barely half of the total number of closed cases listed 
in the BJIPC’s gazette, 5,432. Peking University’s PKULaw, a “gold-standard” of databases for 
legal research in China, only has 1,159 records, a rate of one in five. While a new site dedicated 
to IP-specific rulings from the SPC’s IPR division, China IPR judgments and Decisions, might at 
first appear to hold more promise, the site is technologically unreliable. While the website was 
reportedly functional at least through October 2016, from at least March of 2017, any searches 
on the site return HTTP code 404 errors (page not available). While the phenomenon of 
sensitive cases’ omission from government databases in China is well documented, lapses of 
this size are much more likely the result of a lack of attention and resources than deliberate 
censorship.xcv 
While official government databases are incomplete, the BJIPC and other intellectual 
property courts have partnered with the private company IPHouse to release opinions in a 
reasonably-complete fashion.xcvi IPHouse is, for the time being, willing to give academic 
researchers essentially indefinite “trial” subscriptions that allow full access to the site. 
IPHouse’s database contains 5,022 judgments from the year 2015, a much-more reliable 
reporting rate of 94.25%. While there is no definitive way of knowing the content of the 
remaining 5.25% of cases, they have likely been removed from the record for their sensitivity. 
IPHouse’s search functions are incredibly sophisticated, with 41 easy-to-use search filters 
spanning 6 tabs compared to China Court Monitor’s 15 (Figure 6, Infra). While the data 
download and analysis tools pale in comparison with IPHouse’s (free) US and EU counterparts, 
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court data from the three IP Courts and hundreds of tribunals are far easier to access than they 
are on any other commonly-used platform. Setting the curious step of privatization aside, the 
BJIPC seems to have mostly delivered on its informatization and openness goals, even if a small 
quantity of cases have most likely been censored. 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of China Court Monitor and IPHouse Search Functions 
   
                           China Court Monitor        IPHouse 
 
The high level of completeness in the IPHouse database provides an accurate picture of how 
the BJIPC has actually innovated in judgment. In particular, while many of the court’s innovative 
procedures are specific to individual cases or bodies of IP law, at least six broad trends in 
innovative judgment emerge from the data, presented below roughly in order of least to most 
significant. 
First, the drafting style of BJIPC opinions, especially in complex and highly technical 
cases, differs significantly from that of other courts. On average, BJIPC opinions are 40-50% 
shorter than the decisions of more traditional IP tribunals, despite the fact that the BJIPC 
jurisdiction specifically includes the most technical cases. Especially in the judgments of 
extremely technical patent cases, which tend to be the longest, BJIPC judges utilize a highly 
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specialized segmented drafting style that relies extensively on outline numbering for 
organization. In practice, this form of segmentation is similar to the US Judges’ practices of 
organizing decisions by legal issue. For instance, in 2015 Case No. 3269, an administrative suit 
brought by AUO Optronics against the SIPO for the Patent Reexamination Board’s (PRB’s) denial 
of a patent application for a pixel array on creativity grounds, the BJIPC judge uses outline 
numbering to organize one of the court’s most technical opinions. A similar style is used in one 
of the BJIPC’s shortest decisions, 2015 Case No. 903, an administrative trademark case brought 
by Foshan Nanhai Yalan Royal Furniture against the SAIC for the Trademark Review and 
Adjudication Board’s (TRAB) refusal to approve a trademark for the reason that it was too 
similar to an existing trademark. In this case, the BJIPC judge uses a numerical organization 
scheme to present an argument that moves seamlessly from facts to law to application, as well 
as to exhibit the cited trademarks within the text of the opinion. While these drafting changes 
may seem trivial, especially to western observers who may be used to similar styles, it means 
that BJIPC opinions are significantly easier to skim, read, and understand when compared to the 
more prolix and less consistently organized decisions of other courts. These changes decrease 
litigation costs and increase accessibility of court documents to businesses and the general 
public. While effective drafting is important, the claim that this is truly an innovation must be 
qualified by the fact that there is no indication that these changes are the result of court policy. 
Better drafting may simply be the result of a more experienced and professionalized panel of 




Second, BJIPC decisions explicitly reference the testimony and participation of 
independent technical investigators in technical cases. These investigators write technical 
examination opinions that inform the judges, who may not be proficient in technical matters. 
Previously, the experts on IP tribunals were internal court employees, were notorious for their 
lack of reliability, and were rarely referenced directly in opinions.xcvii As of November 2016, the 
BJIPC had hired over 39 technical investigators, all of whom are either academics or researchers, 
appointed by the court in cases of high technical complexity.xcviii, xcix The vast majority of 
technical investigators are part time, making their job reminiscent of the expert witness in the 
US system, with the important caveat that the technical investigator’s remuneration is covered 
by court fees, rather than by the litigants directly. In addition, the technical investigators 
participate more broadly in the activities of the court, cross-pollinating the academic and 
judicial thinking of BJIPC jurists with their more technical and scientific perspectives.  
Cases that include the participation of technical investigators explicitly mention their 
participation in the “trial process” section of the case. Judges then write technical opinions in 
direct consultation with the technical investigator and his or her report. For instance, in 2015 
Case No. 73-2627, an administrative suit brought by inventor Shao Pengfei against the SIPO for 
the PRB’s denial of a patent application for a noncorrosive water sterilization procedure on 
creativity grounds, the technical investigator Sun Bin, a researcher at BOE Technology Group, 
provided an independent evaluation of the organochemical procedure involved that ultimately 
vindicated the PRB’s decision. In addition to the benefits of having expert technical consultation 
ready for a case, the court’s utilization of the same technical investigators across multiple cases 
serves to increase judicial consistency. While the inclusion of expert testimony in cases isn’t 
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completely new, the heightened independence of the BJIPC’s technical investigators is a novel 
phenomenon in China’s IP litigation.  
Third, the BJIPC appears to be regularly soliciting opinions on cases from disinterested 
third parties, usually academic and research institutions, to assist the court in deciding cases 
that could have significant legal implications. On October 12, 2015, the BJIPC posted a public 
notice on its website and Weibo microblog announcing “Collection and Publication of Opinions 
Regarding Law Application on Issues Related to Article 19.4 of the Trademark Law.”c At the time, 
the court was conducting hearings on 2015 Cases No.s 91, 97, and 98, all of which concerned 
the Shanghai Trademark and Patent Agency, a limited liability corporation, which filed 
administrative lawsuits against the Trademark Office of the SAIC for its denial of their 
trademark application. Article 19.4 of the PRC Trademark law states, “A trademark agency,” a 
firm handling trademark applications on behalf of a client, “shall not apply for registration of 
trademarks other than the ones entrusted to it.”ci  
The issue at hand in the case is text versus intent. In its judgment, the BJIPC 
acknowledges that logically, legislators would have intended Article 19.4 to prevent agencies 
from “maliciously registering trademarks” on behalf of their clients “to seek profit,” not to 
preclude them from registering trademarks for their own use. The text of the law, however, 
rather unambiguously prohibits trademark agencies from registering trademarks for their own 
use. Ultimately, the court determined that to establish the intent claim, the plaintiff must prove 
not simply that the legislators probably intended a given interpretation, but that that 
interpretation can be plausibly “read from the literal meaning of the interpretation.” Because it 
could not, the court affirmed the SAIC’s denial. Because the issue at hand was one of serious 
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legal importance, the court solicited and then directly cited and included (as appendices) the 
submitted legal opinions that it had received from five university IP law research centers from 
across China. This system of public opinion solicitation and incorporation, along the lines of 
amicus briefs in common law jurisdictions, is a revolutionary development in China’s IP 
litigation environment. 
Fourth, second-instance (appellate) judgments in the BJIPC acknowledge disagreements 
among the three-judge collegial panel that hears the cases. While article 43 of the Civil 
Litigation Law, provides that “differing opinions must be recorded accurately,” the law also 
enshrines the principle of the minority’s “subordination to the majority”. cii  In practice, 
dissenting opinions are not publicized, but recorded in a “secret file.”ciii The inclusion of 
dissenting opinions within a published judgment at the BJIPC is a new development in China’s 
court system. For example, in 2015 Case No. 1750, the three judges agreed that the lower court 
had erred on the first issue of determining whether the law of copyright applied in the case (the 
first issue presented), but disagreed 1-2 on whether the works in question, easily reproducible 
employee management rules, met the originality test required for copyright protection (the 
second issue presented). The final judgment presents both the majority and dissenting opinions, 
providing a richer examination of the issue that the customary unanimous opinion would. This 
move towards acknowledgement of judges’ differences of legal opinion within written 
judgments has no antecedents in the modern Chinese legal system. 
Fifth, the BJIPC is the only court in all of China whose adjudication committee has held 
open court in order to rule on important aspects of cases. The first such case, 2015 Case No. 
177, was hailed as a “watershed moment” for both adjudication committee procedure and 
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administrative IP review review in China. Courts at all levels in China have adjudication 
committees, which are officially tasked with discussing difficult cases collecting judicial 
experience, and reviewing court affairs. In practice, committees are typically composed entirely 
of CCP members and handle “politically sensitive cases” in advance, handing down decisions 
that seem to “come from above.”civ The committees are infamous for their lack of transparency, 
and their minutes are generally classified as state secrets.  
In Case No. 177, the adjudication committee of the BJIPC upended this reputation by 
holding an open court session to hear a particularly complex trademark adjudication case, 
issuing a landmark ruling that the 2014 Amendments to Article 1, Section 2 of the 
Administrative Litigation Law’s right to “review” gives citizens the legal authority to sue 
contesting the legality of government agencies’ normative documents (a type of non-legally 
binding document), and for courts’ authority to rule against government agencies in such cases 
and overturn illegal normative document.cv Such a breakthrough in administrative litigation 
would likely not have been possible without the adjudication committee’s special authority 
behind the decision. 
After the court heard and decided case No. 177, the adjudication committee held a 
press conference to discuss the ruling with the media. BJIPC vice president Song Yushui 
announced the criteria adjudication committee involvement as twofold: (1) major and complex 
cases involving diplomacy, national security and social stability and (2) cases involving difficult 
and complicated questions of legal doctrine.cvi At the same press conference, BJIPC President Su 
Chi explained the purpose of the open hearing as a broader effort of increasing China’s 
“national competitiveness” by means of IPR protection, echoing the words of premier Li 
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Keqiang at Davos a few months earlier and reaffirming the connection of the BJIPC to broader 
push for economic liberalization and institutionalization. 
Sixth and finally, the judgments of the BJIPC have made ample use of precedent in their 
legal decision-making. From the very beginning, BJIPC courts regularly cited precedent from 
other courts. 2014 Case No. 50 is one of the earliest examples; in this case, the BJIPC cited a 
prior Beijing High People’s Court case that concerned the same issue: whether the potential 
“negative impact” of a trademark based around the Buddhist word “Zen” was a legitimate 
reason for the SAIC’s TRAB’s rejection of a proposed trademark containing it.  
In 2016, the court’s own “precedent base” was established, allowing direct citation 
tracking between decisions. From then until October 2016, the court cited 279 case precedents 
in 168 cases.cvii The 279 case precedents included 31 (11%) from the SPC, 132 from High Courts 
(47%), and the remaining 116 (42%) from various local courts (foreign cases have not yet been 
cited in BJIPC decisions). Litigants’ arguments (as outlined in written decisions) cited cases 121 
times while judges took their own initiative to cite cases on 47 occasions, while the decisions in 
117 cases relied directly on precedent to reach their conclusions.cviii So far, no precedents have 
been overturned, but it remains to be seen whether or not the court has instituted a policy of 
binding precedent.  
While the lack of a precise start date for the precedent database makes it impossible to 
calculate an exact citation rate for the BJIPC, a lower bound of 2.1% (168 cases citing precedent 
divided by 8,111, the total number of cases tried by the BJIPC in 2018) be established with the 
unrealistically conservative assumption that the only cases that cited precedent in 2016 were 
those that occurred between the establishment of the precedent database and October.cix 
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While the true rate is likely much higher (probably around 10%), even this small rate is orders of 
magnitude higher than that of the GCS. This is a strong indication that the BJIPC’s open-ended 
system of precedent may have hit upon a workable and more organic alternative to the GCS.  
While the BJIPC’s judicial innovations not only provide a veritable menu of reform 
options for China’s IP judicial system, but begin to answer the question of how fair the BJIPC’s 
judgments are. The large-scale participation of technical investigators, for instance, suggests a 
more impartial process in technical cases than in other courts who lack this independent 
authority. The increased citation of precedent in decisions should theoretically increase 
consistency and decrease litigants’ uncertainty, lowering costs for businesses and promoting 
economic growth. Of course, directly observing these effects from a “system in miniature” such 
as the BJIPC (which only handles 10% of China’s total IP docket) is implausible, especially at 
such an early stage.  
Where evaluating judgments is concerned, there are several metrics that can provide 
important indications of whether the BJIPC is doing enough to ensure the fair use and 
enforcement of IP rights. The first measure to look at in the BJIPC is the success rate of plaintiffs, 
especially foreign plaintiffs. The BJIPC in particular has critical importance to foreign holders of 
IP due to the fact that it has jurisdiction over 80% of the combined civil and administrative 
docket for cases involving foreigners.cx Furthermore, if the independence of the BJIPC leads to 
local protectionism for infringers (a concern that Chinese scholars raised before BJIPC data 
became available), we would expect to see this reflected in a low success rate of both domestic 
and especially foreign plaintiffs, with the rate of foreign plaintiff success relatively lower.cxi 
Instead, the opposite was true. In 2015 (the most recent year that complete data is available) 
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plaintiffs in Civil IP infringement cases won 72.34% of their cases, while the success rate of 
foreign plaintiffs was 100% across a total of 63 civil cases, prompting foreign firms to reevaluate 
their prospects in China’s civil IP litigation environment.cxii Admittedly, while the high success 
rate of foreign plaintiffs is an encouraging sign, such reevaluations were likely premature, since 
the volume of civil cases involving foreigners at the BJIPC was too low to draw any definitive 
conclusions about adjudication. 
The BJIPC is most notable not for its impact on Civil IP litigation, but for its enormous 
authority over administrative cases. While results such as the willingness of the adjudication 
committee to expand administrative review of IP agencies are heartening in isolation, it is also 
important to look at data over the entire system. The key variables for fairness in administrative 
litigation at the BJIPC are (1) the rate that cases are withdrawn by the plaintiff (“withdrawal 
rate”) and (2) the rate that cases are decided in favor of the plaintiff, resulting in a court-
ordered revocation of a government agency’s action (“revocation rate”). In an unfair system in 
which the government discourages administrative litigation, the withdrawal rate should be 
relatively high; indeed, a recent paper highlighted the withdrawal rate of administrative 
litigation cases across China (which varied from 30% to 57% from 1994, the year of the 
Administrative Litigation Law’s passage, to 2010) as an indicator of the broader failure of 
administrative litigation in China (at least prior to the ALL revision).cxiii While the revocation rate 
will always be low (since IP administrative agencies are at least reasonably competent at 
following their statutory mandates of issuing and certifying IPRs), an extremely low revocation 
rate would suggest that courts are not giving fair play to administrative plaintiffs’ claims. The 
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2015 data show a low withdrawal rate of 7% (240 cases), and a healthy revocation rate of 17% 
(539 cases).cxiv 
These statistics, while encouraging, only tell a partial story of a court that has existed for 
just over two years. While the BJIPC has already introduced several judicial innovations, 
including a model for case law that appears to have broad applicability even outside of IP, the 
substantive impact of the court on China’s IP litigation environment and innovation space 
remains to be seen. The next section describes the implications of the BJIPC and other 
intellectual property court reforms, discussing critical perspectives and ways forward for what 
is essentially still a pilot project. 
 
Section 3: Implications of the BJIPC Reforms 
 
The BJIPC’s innovations are significant primarily for two main reasons: (1) they have the 
potential to influence the development of IP law in China, and (2) they may impact rule of law 
development more broadly. While the BJIPC is admittedly a small-scale endeavor in terms of 
scope, lifespan, and real world impact, the project has serious implications for the future of 
China’s rule of law, its status as a global innovation leader, and relations with other nations, 
especially the US and Europe. This section discusses the economic, legal, political, and 
international implications of the BJIPC reform, highlighting potential barriers to widespread 
adoption of the BJIPCs innovations alongside the benefits that incentivize taking advantage of 
them. 
In economic terms, BJIPC efforts to increase standardization and consistency decrease 
commercial uncertainty and are therefore good for both foreign and domestic IPR holders—in 
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other words, the BJIPC reforms promote the rule of law. In 2013, the year before the 
establishment of the IP courts, only 47% of the respondents in the China Business Climate 
Survey (conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce in China [ACCC]) believed that 
China’s IP protection had improved in the past five years.cxv In 2015, one year after the courts’ 
establishment, the same number had risen 39 points to 86%. In particular, the BJIPC’s 
willingness to award large compensation to IP plaintiffs and its clear and detailed legal opinions 
have begun to address the two primary substantive concerns of foreign IPR holders during the 
pre-2014 period.cxvi  
While it is too soon to say definitively what effects the BJIPC’s heightened protection of 
IP will have on China’s innovation space, applying existing data and logic suggests that 
increased protection of IPRs combined with market liberalization will allow trade-promoting 
market expansion effects to dominate concentration effects of IPRs that tend to limit trade. cxvii 
This, in turn, may help innovation become a driver of GDP growth and bilateral trade, especially 
with the US and Europe, which have high concentrations of IPR holders in areas in which 
China’s innovation lags behind.cxviii 
The legal implications of the BJIPC reform become relatively clear after following the 
general trends of litigation in the court. Most prominently, the BJIPC as an institution seems to 
support the rule of law, it least in terms of its willingness to hold “the government and its 
officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities […] accountable under the law.”cxix  
On the other hand, the nature of the BJIPC and other IP courts as a non-uniform system 
of justice raises the question whether the parallel nature of both specialized IP courts and 
traditional courts working simultaneously on IP, not to mention the continued failure of 
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administrative enforcement, constitutes an unfair legal system in IP per se.cxx From another 
perspective, this objection claims that even if the IP court’s work is excellent by any measure, 
China’s IP system as a whole cannot be considered “fair” because of the discrepancies that exist 
between the IP courts and the other system. Furthermore, the specialization of IP courts can 
have serious negative consequences if it results in IP becoming a completely separate category 
of jurisprudence, making an already arcane area of law even more impenetrable.   
While these criticisms certainly carry some weight, and are true in their most limited 
sense (that China’s IP enforcement system as a whole is not particularly fair), they seem to 
ignore the fact that the BJIPC, SHIPC, and GZIPC are pilot projects. There is no indication that 
the project of IP courts aims to wall off IP jurisprudence from other areas of law. As they 
operate today, the IP courts are profoundly connected to the broader legal system, as the vast 
majority of the precedent that the BJIPC cites comes from ordinary, nonspecialized people’s 
courts. The allegations of judicial isolationism in IP also seem ignorant of history: IP law has long 
served as a breeding ground for new legal procedures in China that can eventually be 
introduced to the legal system as a whole. Even if the IP courts were separate from the rest of 
the court system, this would be no reason to exempt them from consideration as rule of law 
institutions. If the BJIPC’s structure allows it to hold both state and non-state actors 
accountable under the law, it may rightly be classified as a rule of law institution regardless of 
whether the entire system in which it is situated embodies the rule of law.  
On the practical level, the BJIPC in its current form is likely not replicable across China, 
and expanding the system could face political barriers in the future. While its accomplishments 
have been lauded all over the country, with regional leaders calling for IP courts of their own, 
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the present work of the BJIPC depends heavily on its location in one of the largest and 
wealthiest cities in China, the atypically high level of education that its judges have received, 
and a great deal of judicial exchanges and foreign interaction, particularly with American and 
European lawyers who undoubtedly influenced the development of many of the BJIPCs 
innovations.cxxi Still, a great deal of the BJIPC’s innovations, such as amicus brief solicitation and 
open hearings of the adjudication committee, are easily transferrable to other courts. Other 
innovations, such as case law, could be transferred to the national IP bench after more judicial 
education on the role and scope of case law within China’s civil system. 
While difficult, doing so could be extremely beneficial. The BJIPC’s innovative and 
organic version of case law adds a layer of resilience to the court’s potential to promote the 
rule of law in China. As BJIPC cases themselves become precedent, and perhaps are chosen as 
guiding cases,* the resulting case law could bolster the court’s powers of administrative review. 
If even some elements of the BJIPC’s precedential authority mechanism follow the example of 
previous IP law innovations and are later incorporated into national law, this could lead to 
greater respect for the courts in the Chinese system as a whole. 
The BJIPC’s plaintiff-friendly environment raises another, political question: Why has the 
BJIPC been allowed to directly question and even repudiate the judgment of the CCP-led 
authoritarian government (vis-à-vis revoking the decisions of administrative agencies) in the 
first place? Because IP is an area of law that protects one of the most important and mobile 
types of business assets that is critically important to China’s continued economic growth (and, 
by extension, the legitimacy of CCP rule), IPR rights holders are in a uniquely powerful 
                                                      
* Although the last batch of guiding cases focused on intellectual property, it contained no 
judgments from the BJIPC or any of the other IPCs. 
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bargaining position. In order to sustain growth, China must take advantage of its potential for 
innovation. But in order for IPRs to enrich the Chinese economy, rights holders must remain 
confident that their assets are secure; otherwise, intellectual production will falter as 
innovators and valuable IP flows out beyond China’s borders. The economics of the PRC’s 
innovation imperative likewise suggest an IP protection imperative. Insofar as China’s leaders 
believe that the BJIPC’s innovations represent an incremental step towards a more effective 
system of IP production, learning from its lessons and utilizing its innovations on a broader scale 
may not only be useful, but also necessary.  
Because the BJIPC’s revocations of administrative decisions serve to correct government 
agencies’ failures in IPR protection, such rulings generally do not run contrary to the interests of 
China’s authoritarian government. In fact, the revocations actually serve the CCP’s more 
encompassing interest of boosting economic growth. Since rule of law in the IP sector does 
little to harm political interests, IP is an area in which the rewards for the authoritarian “tying 
his own hands”—economic prosperity, decreased uncertainty costs, and better international 
perceptions—are worse than the small loss in absolute power.cxxii The CCP has clearly signaled 
its intent to expand intellectual property courts in the SPC’s most recent five-year plan, which 
unambiguously calls for “promoting the establishment of intellectual property courts.”cxxiii  
The BJIPC reforms also have several more immediate political benefits. Most obviously, 
the Court provides a model of Chinese law that has appeared to work well, or at least one that 
can be tinkered with experimentally until it produces a system that can be expanded nationally. 
As such, the BJIPC is a powerful propaganda tool against the “wild east” image, showing how 
China is both adopting western judicial tools (open and transparent hearings, amicus briefs, 
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outline-style drafting) into its own IP protection arsenal in addition to devising its own effective 
idiosyncrasies (sophisticated technical review, a new system of precedential authority). An 
example of robust judicial protection in IP also distracts somewhat from the persistently high 
levels of infringement in China, a problem that is far larger and more complex than the 
administration of IP law in the courts. 
As the court with by far the largest share of foreign IP cases, the largest proportion of 
which (36%) are from America, followed by Germany (13%) and France (11%), the BJIPC also 
plays an important role in improving China’s trade relations with the rest of the world. At the 
same time that China had to bend backwards to create an exception for the SAIC’s (a frequent 
defendant at the BJIPC) politically-motivated approval of Trump’s trademark, the BJIPC was 
showing the world how defending foreign IPR’s in China can look like business as usual. As the 
39-percentage point jump in China’s IP reform among businesses surveyed by the ACCC 
between 2013 and 2015 shows, IP courts have been perceived as a major positive development 
not only in China, but overseas as well. 
Conclusion: Trump, Trade, and the BJIPC 
 
The ascent of the PRC from a backward nation of communist peasants to a global 
superpower is arguably the single phenomenon that has most altered the world order that 
emerged from the aftermath of World War II. In recent years, China’s transformation into an 
economic and military powerhouse has worried Americans who see China’s rise as a signal of 
their own country’s perceived decline as a unipolar power, as resulting from an illegitimate use 
and abuse of power, and posing a challenge to American ideals of global democracy and 
geopolitical fair play.  
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No event has underscored these beliefs more than the election of Donald Trump, who 
opened his campaign by saying, “We don't have victories anymore. We used to have victories, 
but we don't have them. When was the last time anybody saw us beating, let's say, China in a 
trade deal? I beat China all the time. All the time."cxxiv President Xi responded resolutely to 
Trump’s sabre rattling with the simple assertion that cooperation with China is the new 
president’s “only choice.”cxxv Xi is right. As the two most powerful nations on the planet by far, 
the US in China exist in a state of competitive interdependence.   
No issue presents this interdependence more starkly than international commerce. The 
US and China are each other’s largest trading partners, exchanging an estimated 659.4 Billion 
USD in goods and services in 2015. cxxvi  The number grows each year. Exports to China alone 
support over 951,000 US jobs.cxxvii Yet trade also brings out US-China competitiveness. While US 
leaders initially hoped that China’s 2001 WTO accession fifteen years ago would help reign in 
some of these conflicts, problems clearly persist. Enormous barriers to market and investment 
access exist on both sides of the Pacific, anticompetitive subsidy and tariff patterns generate 
bilateral tensions, and threats of trade retaliation produce chilling effects on international trade 
flows.cxxviii  
Trump’s ascent to power has underscored not only the conflict between US and China 
on IP law, but also points of cooperation. US media outlets widely reported China’s expedition 
of the long-delayed approval of Trump’s trademark applications as a means to “curry favor” 
with the new president, but neglected to mention how Trump’s claims were only made possible 
by revisions to the trademark laws. cxxix While the 24-hour news cycle lays bare the ability of the 
Communist Party of China (CCP) leaders to manipulate the law of the land to serve diplomatic 
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and political realities, it also misses a less-noticed but critically important fact. China’s leaders 
have long been devising and enacting reforms, slowly and cautiously building a procedurally 
and substantively fair system of intellectual property law in China.  
While the BJIPC is a particularly recent example of this phenomenon, China has made 
great strides forward in in protecting IPRs, especially considering that just 37 years ago, China 
had essentially no system of IP protection. Today, China’s legal architecture is fully compliant 
with international agreements on trade, even if consistent, effective enforcement remains 
elusive. 
When it comes to dealing with a Trump administration intent on a trade showdown, the 
BJIPC will be a major asset to China for its role in assuring businesses that courts will be willing 
to respect and uphold their legitimate IP claims. The more American businesses believe that 
China’s IP protection environment is improving, the more likely they will to oppose hostile trade 
policy that may put these positive developments in jeopardy. At the extreme, positive 
perception of the BJIPC’s work may help China to avoid a repeat of the H.W. Bush- Clinton-era 
trade threats by convincing US IPR-controlling firms that China not only wants their business, 
but is willing to stand up and protect it. 
However, the BJIPC also presents an opportunity for the US. The vast majority of its new 
policies, while “innovative” in the context of Chinese law, appear familiar to Americans as 
storied elements of the US’s own legal system. Indeed, the BJIPC reforms are part of a long 
history of US influence in China’s legal development. The BJIPC has reaffirmed that China is not 
only willing, but eager to learn from the example of American legal institutions, and serves as a 
powerful reminder that the US’s legal reform work with China at the Strategic & Economic 
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Dialogue and other summits have had profound impacts on China’s legal institutions, and that 
these impacts benefit US firms and citizens. While the Trump administration should continue to 
take China’s IP infringement seriously, it must do so with an understanding that without 
transpacific cooperation, China’s legal institutions and IP protection regime would certainly look 
worse than they do today. As much as the BJIPC reminds US foreign policy makers of the 
benefits of cooperating with China to build institutions of law, it must also show how much we 
have to lose from the breakdown of this cooperation. 
The BJIPC is one piece in the puzzle of law, politics, economics, and international 
relations that surround China’s intellectual property environment. While its model is not yet 
ready to be applied throughout China, the zeal of Chinese leaders in adapting and spreading the 
IP court model throughout their country means that anyone concerned with China’s IP 
protection or rule of law development overlooks ongoing and future developments in the BJIPC 
at their own peril.  
China’s legal environment may be filled with contradictions, but the BJIPC shows that it 
is better for it. By carving out this enclave of effective, rationalized enforcement within a deeply 
troubled system of IPR protection, China has demonstrated its ability to move forward in IP 
protection. The BJIPC experiments have arrived at an opportune moment in history—within the 
greater context of economic liberalization, shifts away from labor force and capital investment 
as sources of growth, a rapidly growing innovation culture, and the looming specter of trade 
wars with the United States, the time for a better IPR regime is now. 
 While the BJIPC’s footprint on the world is still very small, its willingness both to adapt 
judicial practices from abroad and create new ones to suit the purpose of more consistent and 
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fair decision-making makes it a vanguard of legal development in China to be closely scrutinized. 
As the BJIPC continues to develop, innovations from this enclave of enforcement may find their 
way into courtrooms across the country, and perhaps inspire new laws. China’s fledgling 
intellectual property courts will grow and multiply, profoundly impacting not only China’s 
mechanisms and institutions of IP protection, but potentially the legal architecture of the state 
itself. In this way, the BJIPC represents a step towards an era of more sustainable growth, 
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